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Global interpersonal inequality
Trends and measurement
Miguel Niño-Zarazúay, Laurence Roopez and Finn Tarpx
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses di¤erent approaches to the measurement of global interpersonal in-
equality. Trends in global interpersonal inequality during 1975-2005 are measured using data
from UNU-WIDERs World Income Inequality Database. In order to better understand the
trends, global interpersonal inequality is decomposed into within-country and between-country
inequality. The paper illustrates that the relationship between global interpersonal inequality
and these constituent components is a complex one. In particular, we demonstrate that the
changes in Chinas and Indias income distributions over the past 30 years have simultaneously
caused inequality to rise domestically in those countries, while tending to reduce global inter-
personal inequality. In light of these ndings, we reect on the meaning and policy relevance of
global vis-à-vis domestic inequality measures.
Keywords: global interpersonal inequality, inequality, inequality measurement
JEL Classications: D31, D63, E01, O15,
1 Introduction
Since the turn of the century, income inequality has become one of the most prominent political
issues of our time. The World Economic Forums Global Risks 2013 report identied global
income disparityas the global risk most likely to manifest itself over the next ten years. Issues
of taxation and redistribution were central to the debate in the 2012 US presidential elections
and in a number of recent general elections in Europe. There has also been signicant interest
in the economic literature in the level of, and trends in, various concepts of global inequality.
The earliest of these papers were predominantly focused on either within-countryinequality,
as in Cornia and Kiiski (2001) or between-country inequality (see, for example, Boltho and
Toniolo 1999; Firebaugh 1999, 2003; Melchior, Telle and Wiig 2000). Much of the impetus
for these studies came from concerns as to what impact the recent era of globalization may
We are grateful to seminar participants at the Universities of Helsinki, Oxford, Bielefeld, and Beijing Normal
University for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. All the errors are ours.
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have had on inequality (see, for example, Richardson 1995; Wood 1995 and Williamson 1999,
and also UNDP 1999, which explicitly called for policies to mitigate rising inequality caused by
economic globalization).
To quote Milanovic (2002:52), a direct implication of globalization is that national borders
are becoming less important, and that every individual may, in theory, be regarded simply as
a citizen of the world. The literature on global inequality trends began to focus on estimating
levels of global interpersonal inequality. In this approach, the global distribution of income of
all the citizens of the world is constructed from national accounts and/or survey data.1 Inequal-
ity is subsequently measured, based on this global interpersonal distribution of income. Notable
contributions in this area have been made by Korzeniewicz and Moran (1997); Chotikapanich,
Valenzuela and Rao (1997); Schultz (1998); Milanovic (2002, 2005); Bourguignon and Morrisson
(2002); Dickhavoc and Ward (2002); Bhalla (2002); Dowrick and Akmal (2005); Sala-i-Martin
(2006); and Atkinson and Brandolini (2010). See also Anand and Segal (2008) for a critical
review of this strand of literature.
This study adds to the body of literature on trends in global interpersonal inequality which,
for convenience, we will refer to hereafter simply as global inequality. Most of the aforemen-
tioned studies consider trends in global inequality only up to the mid 1990s, and none beyond
the year 2000. In this paper, using the most recent version of UNU-WIDERs World Income
Inequality Database (WIID), we estimate global inequality levels, and their within-country and
between-country components, at ten-year intervals, between 1975 and 2005.
Having more recent estimates of global inequality levels is clearly valuable in its own right.
However, the years following 2000 are of particular interest for a study on global inequality
trends. This was the period immediately leading up to the global nancial crisis. A number
of studies argued that high levels of inequality were part of the cause of the nancial crisis,
and of nancial crises generally. Stiglitz (2012), for example, has discussed a ...two-way
relationship between inequality and economic uctuations...and found that Inequality can
contribute to volatility and the creation of crises, and volatility can contribute to inequality.
Berg and Ostry (2011) found that longer spells of growth are robustly associated with more
equal income distributions. In the context of the sub-prime mortgage crisis, which precipitated
the global nancial crisis, Rajan (2010:43), argues that growing income inequality in the
United States...led to political pressure for more housing credit. This pressure created a serious
fault line that distorted lending in the nancial sector.
Not all economists are of the same view. Acemoglu (2011), for example, argues that it is more
plausible that the nancial crisis and high levels of inequality, especially at the top-end of the
income distribution, were common outcomes arising from lack of regulation of nancial practices.
Bordo and Meissner (2012) provide another dissenting view, arguing that credit booms heighten
the probability of a banking crisis but nding no evidence that increased inequality leads to
credit booms. Atkinson and Morelli (2011), in a long-run empirical investigation on both the
impact of economic crises on inequality and of the impact of inequality on the probability of
crises, obtain inconclusive results. It is not our intention to weigh into these controversies in
this paper. Su¢ ce to say that better knowledge of global inequality levels and trends in the
1Actually some studies have focused on income and others on consumption. We use the term incomeloosely
for now but will discuss some of the issues arising from the important distinction between the two in Section 3.
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run up to the crisis is invaluable for any research as to what, if any, role inequality may have
played in causing the crisis.
As indicated above, analyzing the impact of the nancial crisis on subsequent inequality is
another active area of research. Given the global nature of the crisis, research into its impact
on global inequality might be regarded to be an important aspect of such research. Knowledge
of pre- and post-crisis global inequality levels is clearly an essential requirement for studies of
this kind too.
A number of previous studies have drawn attention to the fact that changes in Indias and
(especially) Chinas income distributions, are likely to have a very pronounced impact on global
inequality trends. Most obviously, the sheer size of their populations gives them signicant
weight in any calculation of global inequality. In this paper, we pay particular attention to
the impact of India and China on the level and evolution of global inequality over the period
from 1975 to 2005. We do so with a focus also on the changes in domestic inequality that
have taken place in these countries. We conduct a counterfactual analysis, in which India and
Chinas populations grew as they actually did over the period of analysis, but their levels and
distributions of incomes remained as they were in 1975.
Strikingly, we nd that the changes which occurred in India and China simultaneously re-
sulted in spiralling domestic inequality, together with a pronounced dampening force on global
inequality levels. This dampening force was substantial enough to cause global inequality to
fall over the period of analysis, where it would otherwise have risen. The explanation for
this apparent dichotomy lies in the fact that the increases in domestic inequality coincided
with a remarkably prolonged period of extremely strong growth in these countries. By using
Theils decomposable mean log deviationmeasure of inequality, together with our counter-
factual analysis, we nd that the changes in India and China resulted in an increase in the
within-country component of global inequality, but that this was more than o¤-set by the ac-
companying decrease in the between-country component. Nevertheless, by conducting a further
counterfactual analysis, we nd that if India and China had been able to achieve the same rate of
growth during 1975-2005 as they actually did, whilst avoiding increases in domestic inequality,
this would have resulted in still lower levels of global inequality in 2005.
Overall, the picture that emerges from our study of the pre-crisis world in 2005 is one
of widespread increases in domestic inequality together with reduced (though still very high)
inequality between countries. Drawing on our results, we reect on the likely evolution of global
inequality if current trends continue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the importance of
measuring inequality in general. In Section 3 we discuss concepts and challenges involved in
measuring global interpersonal inequality. In particular, we discuss the relationship between
global interpersonal inequality and within-country and between-country inequality. In Section
4 we discuss some theoretical aspects of inequality measurement, with a particular focus on the
Gini coe¢ cient and the mean log deviation. In Section 5 we describe the data and discuss some
of the empirical challenges and techniques. In Section 6 we provide our estimates of trends
in global interpersonal inequality, and its within-country and between-country components,
with particular reference to the impact of China and India. We also conduct the synthetic
counterfactual analyses described above relating to India and China, to estimate their e¤ect
3
on global distribution. In Section 7 we do some sensitivity analysis on our main results. In
Section 8 we discuss our main ndings, with particular reference to previous studies. Concluding
remarks on the implications of our study are o¤ered in Section 9.
2 The importance of inequality measurement
There are many reasons why one might have a concern for inequality and wish to measure it.
Perhaps the most obvious reason is that high levels of inequality are deemed to be socially
unfair. Since the time of ancient societies, scholars have been concerned about the possible
negative e¤ects of inequality on peace and prosperity. In his dialogue with Adeimantus, and
reproduced in Platos Republic (1901:422), Socrates was already aware of the pervasive e¤ects
of indiscriminate wealth in deteriorating peace and order. Also, under the inuence of Plato,
Aristotle (1954:1379a) saw in inequity a source of conict and anger. In that context, the state
was seen as fundamental to ensure peace and prosperity through the procurement of justice and
social equality (Plato 1901).
Classical economists, from Adam Smith and David Ricardo to Karl Marx, were concerned
about the e¤ects of unfair distribution of income on factors of production, and social classes.
These were, of course, discussions in the domain of normative principles. Others have also
argued for the signicance of inequality of opportunity as an obstacle for progress and devel-
opment. Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), for example, argued that egalitarians should seek to equalize
resources rather than outcomes. Roemer (1993, 1998) introduced a model which separated the
determinants of the welfare outcomes a person experiences into circumstances and e¤ort. He
argued that individuals should only be held responsible for the latter. In contrast to e¤ort, a
person has no choice with respect to the circumstances of the environment he is born into. In
Roemers (1993, 1998) framework, an equal-opportunity policy is an intervention which levels
the playing eldby ensuring that equal outcomes in achievement accrue to individuals who
have expended the same amount of e¤ort.23 Whilst inequality of opportunity is beyond the
scope of this paper, its importance for the analysis of inequality is undeniable.
With the rise of development economics theory, the concerns of inequality were linked to
the development process, giving an emphasis to the trend of increasing inequality as countries
transited from agrarian to industrial societies; see Lewis (1954); Kuznets (1955).
More recently, and following the neoclassical paradigm of the Solow growth model (Solow
1956), there has been a particular focus on the relationship between inequality and economic
growth. The rst empirical studies of the relationship between growth and inequality found an
unambiguous detrimental impact of inequality on growth. For example, Alesina and Perotti
(1996) found that income inequality, by fuelling social discontent, increases sociopolitical insta-
2For further philiosophical and normative discussion of equality of opportunity and related issues see Arneson
(1989); Cohen (1989); Fleurbaey (2008); and Rawls (1971).
3There have also been some recent empirical attempts to measure inequality of opportunity. For example,
drawing on Roemers (1993, 1998) distinction between circumstances and e¤ort, Bourguignon, Ferreira and
Menéndez (2005) have decomposed earnings inequality in Brazil into a component due to unequal opportunities
and a residual term. They found that around a quarter of total inequality was due to di¤erences in observable
circumstances. In another recent study, Checchi and Peragine (2010) proposed a methodology for decomposing
total inequality into ethically acceptableand ethically o¤ensivecomponents and, in an application to data
from Italy, found that inequality of opportunity accounts for around 20 per cent of total inequality.
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bility. They found, furthermore, that this instability leads to reduced investment, by creating
uncertainty in the politico-economic environment. As a consequence, income inequality and in-
vestment, an important engine of growth, are inversely related.4 A review by Benabou (1996:13)
nds that These regressions, run over a variety of datasets and periods with many di¤erent
measures of income distribution, deliver a consistent message: initial inequality is detrimental
to long-run growth.
In contrast, Forbes (2000) found that in the short and medium term, an increase in a coun-
trys level of income inequality has a signicant positive relationship with subsequent economic
growth. Still other studies have found more nuanced relations between inequality and growth.5
Barro (2000), for example, found that higher inequality tends to retard growth in poor countries
but promote growth in richer countries. Banerjee and Duo (2003), on the other hand, found
the growth rate to be an inverted U-shaped function of net changes in inequality, in which any
changes in inequality are associated with reduced growth in the subsequent period. The lack of
consensus and the importance of the topic will ensure that the debate rages on.
In our introduction we drew attention to possible links between high levels of inequality
and nancial crises. High levels of inequality have also been blamed for, among many other
things, political instability (Alesina and Perotti, 1996), crime (Kelly, 2000), corruption (You
and Khagram, 2005), and poor health (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2006). Such issues are typically
complex and multi-faceted, with possible reverse causality. Again, a fuller consideration of these
issues is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear that good measurement of inequality is
essential for any such empirical analyses.6
Some of the discussion above may seem more obviously applicable to domestic, within-
country,inequality. However, as the world becomes increasingly inter-connected, it is natural
that relations between global inequality and global levels of growth, health, corruption, political
stability, crime and so on will increasingly be of interest. Both domestic and global inequality
are important in these regards and this paper is concerned with each of them. In order to clarify
precisely what we are and are not analysing in this paper, various concepts of inequality are
discussed in the next section.
4For a discussion on the e¤ects of redistributive and scal policies on growth see Alesina and Rodrik (1994)
and Perotti (1996).
5 It was in that context that the empirical work of Caselli et al. (1996) and Islam (1995) introduced the General
Method of Moments proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Arellano-Bond (1991) to tackle issues
of inconsistency from individual e¤ects and endogeneity found in cross-country studies of the relationship between
inequality and growth.
6There might also be good reasons to measure other concepts of income inequality, not directly related to
the present study. For example, one might wish to conduct an empirical analysis of convergencetheory, which
predicts that per capita incomes across countries should converge over time. But note that, as explained in the
next section, this is not the same thing as between-countryinequality.
5
3 Concepts and challenges in global interpersonal inequality
measurement
3.1 Within-country, between-country, and global inequality
Milanovic (2005) provided a useful framework, subsequently extended by Anand and Segal
(2008), for distinguishing between di¤erent concepts of inequality.7 Keeping to this framework
we can dene four concepts of inequality. Concept zerois inequality among countries, where
countries are ranked according to their total income, and every country receives an equal weight.
We are not concerned with this concept of inequality in the present study but it is the concept
which would be most appropriate if one wished to analyse, for example, relations between
countriestotal incomes and their power on the world stage.
Concept oneis inequality among countries, where countries are ranked according to their
average per capita income, and every country receives an equal weight. This is not the focus
of this study either, but is the most suitable concept for analyzing certain economic questions,
such as whether convergencetheory appears to stand up empirically.
Concept twois what we refer to throughout this paper as between-country inequality. This
is what the inequality among all the individuals in the world would be if each person received
the average per capita income for his country.
Concept three inequality is global interpersonal inequality (or global inequality), the in-
equality inherent in the actual global distribution of income, of all the citizens of the world.
In this study we focus on Concept twoand Concept threeinequality. We also consider
the within-country component of global inequality but stop short of dening it as a new
concept. This refers to the level of global inequality which is not attributable to between-
country inequality. This is a more involved concept than it might appear at rst glance and, as
discussed in the next section, can only be appropriately measured using a very specic class of
inequality measures.
3.2 Income inequality and consumption inequality
Thus far we have used the term incomerather loosely. It is important to distinguish between
incomeand consumptioninequality. It is well-known that, in general, income inequality is
likely to be considerably higher than consumption inequality. The reason is quite straightfor-
ward. The lowest quantiles of a distribution based on consumption typically take a greater
share of the consumption piethan the corresponding quantiles of income do. Conversely, the
highest quantiles usually get a higher share of the income piethan they do of consumption.
Based on their analysis, Deininger and Squire (1996) have suggested adding 6.6 per cent to Gini
coe¢ cients based on expenditure to make them more comparable with income Ginis. In this
study we focus on income inequality.8
7This subsection closely follows the discussion in Anand and Segal (2008).
8 In order to increase our sample of country-year observations, we do resort to using expenditure data in places,
but make adjustments. This procedure is described in Section 5.
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3.3 Inequality at market exchange rates and at PPP
The measurement of global inequality requires an appropriate set of exchange rates to convert
the various national currencies into a common numeraire. The natural choice, and that adopted
in most of the literature and in this paper, is to convert national currencies into purchasing power
parity (PPP). In this paper, for example, all currencies are converted into 2005 US$ at PPP. In
theory, one dollar at 2005 PPP enables one to purchase the same quantity of goods and services
in any country and is an equivalent amount to that which US$1 would have purchased in the
US in 2005.
The same does not apply when incomes are converted to a common numeraire, such as US$,
using market exchange rates. This is because market exchange rates are determined only by the
relative prices of traded goods across countries. The relative price of untraded goodssuch as
housing, transpot, and educationis typically considerably lower in developing countries. Eval-
uating incomes in developing countries at market prices therefore tends to understate incomes
in terms of purchasing power and would be expected to lead to exaggerated measures of both
global inequality and between-country inequality.
Constructing consistent PPP conversion factors is a considerable undertaking. It requires
nding comparable baskets of goodsto compare purchasing power across countries. Yet pur-
chasing habits and patterns di¤er across countries, as do the kinds of goods that are available.
The two most commonly used methods are the Geary-Khamis (GK) and the Eltetö-Köves-Szulc
(EKS) methods.9 Anand and Segal (2008) provide an excellent discussion of the relative merits
of the di¤erent methods, in the context of global inequality measurement, and come down in
favour of the EKS method. The 2005 US$ PPP conversion factors used in this study are those
estimated by, and obtainable from, the World Bank. Their more recent PPP estimates use the
EKS method and the full details of their construction is described in World Bank (2008).
4 Inequality measures
Of central importance to any study on inequality is the selection of the index used to measure
it. The choice of the index embodies fundamental normative judgements that are important to
be aware of and which should be made explicit. The most widely used measure of inequality is
the Gini coe¢ cient.
It is dened graphically with respect to the Lorenz curve, which depicts the cumulative
share of, e.g., income or consumption expenditure, corresponding to the cumulative population
share. In a uniform, completely equal, income distribution the corresponding Lorenz curve is a
45 degree line, known as the line of equality. The Gini coe¢ cient is the area which lies between
the line of equality and the actual Lorenz curve, divided by the total area under the line of
equality.
More formally, suppose that f(Xk; Yk) : k 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ngg are the known points on the
Lorenz curve, ordered so that Xk 1 < Xk for all k 2 f1; : : : ; ng, so that Xk is the cumula-
tive proportion of the population for k 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng, X0 = 0 and Xn = 1; Yk is the cumulative
9Another method, known as the Afriatmethod was developed by Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) though is less
widely used.
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proportion of income (or consumption expenditure) for k 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng, Y0 = 0 and Yn = 1:
Then the Gini coe¢ cient can be approximated as follows:10
Gini  1 
nX
k=1
(Xk  Xk 1)(Yk + Yk 1) (1)
When there are n equal intervals on the cumulative proportion of the population, equation
(1) can be simplied as:
Gini  1  1
n
nX
k=1
(Yk + Yk 1) (2)
The popularity of the Gini index is largely due to its attractive intuitive geometric interpre-
tation, taking values betwen 0 and 1, with 0 reecting perfect equality and 1, perfect inequality.
The Gini also has some normatively appealing characteristics. It satises the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle whereby, ceteris paribus, a transfer of income from a better-o¤ individual to
a less well-o¤ individual must lead to a reduction in inequality. It also satises a population
invariance principle, which enables consistent comparison of populations of di¤erent sizes.
In the present context, one of the main drawbacks of the Gini coe¢ cient is that it is not
decomposable into within-country and between-country inequality components.11 In contrast,
the Theil L measure, which belongs to the family of generalized entropy measures, is additively
decomposable, with population share weights. It is also known as the mean log deviation
(hereafter, MLD), because it gives the mean deviation of logged income. Suppose that, in a
group of N individuals, Yi is the income belonging to individual i 2 f1; : : : Ng and Y = 1N
NP
i=1
Yi.
The MLD can then be expressed as:
MLD =
1
N
NX
i=1
ln(
Y
Yi
) (3)
As Anand and Segal (2008:85) point out, of the various inequality indices which have been
use to measure global inequality in the literature, the MLD is the only measure which has a
consistent interpretation of its between- and within-group components. In this study we use
both the Gini coe¢ cient (mainly on account of its popularity and for the sake of comparability
with other studies) and the MLD (mainly due to its decomposability). As noted above, use of
any inequality measure embodies certain normative judgements. It should be stressed that each
of these measures implicitly adopts one particular judgement that not everyone may support.
They satisfy a scale invarianceproperty, in which a proportional increase in all incomes must
leave inequality unchanged. That is, they belong to the class of relative inequalitymeasures.
Relative inequality measures have been by far the most widely used in empirical studies but a
strong case can also be made for attaching some importance to absolute di¤erences in income.
Indeed Kolm (1976) went as far as describing the relative inequality approach as rightest.
10 In this computation the Lorenz curve is appoximated on the intervals between known points (Xk; Yk) and
(Xk+1; Yk+1) as a straight line.
11For a discussion on decomposable income inequality measures, see Bourguignon (1979).
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Conversely, the absolute inequalityapproach, of demanding that inequality is una¤ected by an
increase of the same absolute amount to all incomes, was described by Kolm (1976) as leftist.
Experimental evidence (see for example Amiel and Cowell 1992, 1997) has shown support for
both these approaches and for intermediary centristpositions. See also Atkinson and Bran-
dolini (2010), who re-examine these and other key concepts underlying the welfare approach to
measuring income inequality, with particular reference to global inequality.
5 Data and empirical issues and techiques
5.1 Data compilation
The analysis in this paper is conducted using the latest version of the WIID, which contains
repeated cross-country information on Gini coe¢ cients and income (or consumption) quantiles
for 156 countries, spanning the period 1950-2008. It is the most comprehensive and complete
database of worldwide distributional data currently available.
As is to be expected with a secondary database of this scale, the data originate from many
di¤erent sources. The various household surveys and other sources from which the WIID is
compiled di¤er in many important respects. Some of the di¤erences are conceptual. For exam-
ple, some surveys are based on income and others on consumption. Among those data which
refer to income, some are before tax and some are after tax. The surveys also di¤er in coverage;
some are national, others are focused solely on rural or on urban areas and others still exclude
certain groups, such as the self-employed. Some surveys take the household as the unit of analy-
sis and others the individual. Importantly, the data also di¤er with respect to their quality and
reliability. In its latest incarnation, all country-year observations are assigned a quality rating
ranging from 1 to 4, where 1 denotes the highest quality and 4 the lowest. A score of 1, for
example, means that the underlying concepts are known and the survey is judged as su¢ cient
according to a number of criteria.12
The focus in this study centres on four specic years at ten year intervals - 1975, 1985, 1995
and 2005. In each of the years analysed, there is an inevitable trade-o¤ between using data as
close as possible to the desired years, while maintaining as high a coverage as possible of the
global population at those times. The compromise adopted was to choose these four years and
to include observations within a maximum of ve years of each data point - with a preference,
naturally, for observations as close to each of these years as possible.13 So, for example, the
2005 observations actually come from 2000-10, but are concentrated around 2005 as much as
possible.
As well as favouring data close to the four specied years, all other things being equal,
we had a number of other preferences. Our inequality estimates are ultimately built up from
quantile share data. In order to obtain more precise estimates, we had a preference for data
based on deciles or, better still, the lower nine deciles plus the top two vingtiles, rather than
quintile shares. Since it is a study on global interpersonal inequality, we also had a preference for
12For further information on the WIID database, including details of the quality criteria, see the WIID User
Guide and Data Sources, downloadable from [http://website1.wider.unu.edu/wiid/WIID2c.pdf].
13We regarded ve years as an absolute cut-o¤ in this respect. If there were only observations more than ve
years from the desired country-year, these were not used.
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those data in which the person, rather than the household, was the unit of analysis. Naturally,
we preferred data based on surveys with a more representative coverage of the entire population
and those in which the quality of the data is deemed to be highest.
We had one nal important preference. As highlighted in Section 3.2, our focus is on global
income (rather than expenditure) inequality. Of the 3,013 country-year observations in the
WIID database with quantile share data, 85 per cent are income based. Naturally, all other
things being equal, we used income data rather than expenditure data. Nevertheless, ignoring
the consumption based data completely would have dramatically reduced the coverage of the
desired countries and years. Where no suitable income-based data were available but we had
data on expenditure, we used the expenditure data and adjusted it as described in the following
subsection.
A number of additional adjustments to the data could certainly be entertained to account for
the various other conceptual and coverage issues discussed above. However, no more were made
and in this regard we plead a similar defence to Milanovic (2002:56) who, faced with comparable
issues, wrote that, ...no adjustments to the surveys were made rst, because information on
sources of the bias survey-by-survey is unavailable, and second, even if we had information
regarding omission of certain population categories, it is simply beyond the scope of knowledge
of any single researcher to make meaningful corrections for such a great and varied number of
surveys.
Before turning to the adjustment procedure, we note that, nally, where there was seemingly
nothing to choose between more than one source for a given country-year, we took an average
of the quantile shares from these di¤erent sources. At the end of the process we were left with
64, 90, 125 and 104 country-year observations in 1975, 1985, 1995 and 2005 respectively. This
provided us with a sample which covers 78 per cent of the worlds population in 1975, 87 per cent
in 1985, 94 per cent in 1995 and 88 per cent in 2005. The full list of country-year observations
for each of the respective years is outlined in Tables 10 to 13 in the Appendix.
5.2 Converting consumption quantile shares into income quantile shares
Deininger and Squire (1996), in the context of their dataset, suggest adding 6.6 Gini points to
Gini coe¢ cients based on consumption to obtain the corresponding income Gini coe¢ cients.
In this study, as described in the following subsection, all our inequality estimates are made
directly using quantile share data. This clearly requires a di¤erent approach to that of Deininger
and Squire (1996), but it might be regarded as being in a similar spirit.
We began, starting with the full WIID database, by comparing the average quantile shares
for income with the corresponding quantile shares for consumption. However, in order to ensure
that we were comparing like with like as far as possible, we focused only on those country-years
for which there are income and consumption data in exactly the same year. Where there was a
choice of sources for a given country-years income or consumption data, we had a preference for
instances where the sources for the income and consumption data where the same. This was in
order to minimize di¤erences due to other factors, such as di¤erent survey designs. The average
shares per quantile for consumption and for income, and the average di¤erences between them,
are displayed in Table 1.
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Table 1: Converting consumption quantile shares to income quantile shares
Quantile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Avge Consumption share (%) 2.46 3.59 4.72 5.51 6.76 7.79 9.64 11.52 16.10 15.91 16.00
Avge Income share (%) 1.71 2.82 3.85 4.70 5.87 7.02 8.89 11.06 16.25 18.41 19.44
Adjustment (% points) -0.75 -0.77 -0.86 -0.82 -0.89 -0.78 -0.75 -0.45 0.16 2.50 3.44
Note : Quantiles 1 to 9 are the bottom 9 deciles: Quantiles 10 and 11 are the top two vingtiles
Source : see text
As expected, the lowest quantiles for consumption have a higher share than the correspond-
ing quantiles for income, while the highest quantiles for consumption have a lower share than
the corresponding quantiles for income. Where we had consumption-based quantile data for a
given country-year, the shares were adjusted by the amounts indicated in Table 1.14
Also note that the income Gini coe¢ cients (as reported in the WIID database, not as
calculated by us) based on the sample of country-years with which we performed the analysis
above, are on average 7.8 points higher than the corresponding consumption Ginis. Since
Deininger and Squire (1996)s database is an important source for the WIID, it is perhaps not
surprising that this gure is in the same ball park as their gure of 6.6. Indeed 6.6 lies within
the 95 per cent condence interval of our estimate of 7.8.
5.3 Estimating global inequality indices from country quantile data
Thus far we have discussed the collation of income-based quantile share data, at the country
level, for each of the countries and years indicated. These quantile shares are su¢ cient for
evaluation of domestic inequality, using relative inequality measures. However, estimating global
inequality requires constructing a global distribution of income, using country-level quantile
data. To do this, we need to consider both the number of individuals and the income per capita
within each of the country-level quantiles. The number of individuals per country-quantile were
calculated based on population data from a number of sources.15 The income levels per capita,
per country-quantile, were calculated based on GDP data. GDP for the various country-years,
in 2005 US$ at PPP, were obtained from the World Banks databank.16
14 In a few exceptional cases, where the adjustment took some of the bottom quantilesshares below zero, these
were instead simply taken to be zero and an equivalent subtraction taken from the top quantile.
15The main sources were: (1) United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects, (2) United
Nations Statistical Division. Population and Vital Statistics Report (various years), (3) Census reports and other
statistical publications from national statistical o¢ ces, (4) Eurostat: Demographic Statistics, (5) Secretariat of
the Pacic Community: Statistics and Demography Programme, and (6) U.S. Census Bureau: International
Database.
16 In most cases we were able to obtain GDP values, in 2005 USD PPP, directly from the databank. There are
a few exceptions. We made an estimate for Serbia and Montenegro in 1995, based on the Montenegro portion
for 1997. For Belarus 1985 we used the 1990 value as an estimate. For Bulgaria 1975 we used the 1980 value as
an estimate. For the Czech Republic 1985 we used the 1990 value as an estimate. For Kazakhstan 1985 we used
the 1990 value as an estimate. For Kyrgyz Republic 1985 we used the 1986 value as an estimate. For Lithuania
1985 we used the 1990 value as an estimate. For New Zealand 1975 we used the 1977 value as an estimate. For
Poland 1985 we used the 1990 value as an estimate. For the Russian Federation 1985 we used 1989 as a (possibly
very poor) estimate. For Slovenia 1985 we used the 1990 value as an estimate. For Switzerland 1975 we used
the 1980 value as an estimate. For Turkmenistan 1985 we used the 1987 value as an estimate. For Ukraine
1985 we used the 1987 value as an estimate. For Uzbekistan 1985 we used the 1987 value as an estimate. The
Jamaican values for 1975, 1985 and 1995 are based on data no longer available on the World Banks website:
http://data.worldbank.org/
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As in the majority of previous studies, we made the simplifying assumption that all in-
dividuals in the same country-quantile-year have the same income.17 As is well recognized,
this approach should be expected to bias the inequality estimates downwards and the resulting
estimates should be interpreted as being lower bounds. As Milanovic (2002) has discussed,
there are some reasonable grounds for taking this rather conservative approach. In particu-
lar, we do not in general know the upper and lower bounds for the individual-level incomes in
each country-quantile. A degree of guesswork is therefore required in any smoothing exercise.
Like Milanovic (2002), we prefer to take the cautious approach of estimating minimum levels
of inequality. Anand and Segal (2008) suggest that studies which follow this approach should
consider the sensitivity of the resulting estimates to di¤erent degrees of inequality, particularly
the maximum possible degree of inequality, within country-quantiles. We discuss this issue in
Section 7.
Formally, the methodology used to construct the global income distribution is as follows.
Let ycq;t be the average per capita income in quantile q 2 f1; : : : ; Qg of country c 2 f1; : : : ; Cg
in year t 2 ft1; : : : tT g : As discussed above, domestic inequality in a given country-year is
estimated under the assumption that all individuals in the same quantile have the average per
capita income for that country-year-quantile; the world distribution of income in year t is then
constructed by compiling all such available country-quantile data in year t: In any given country,
year and quantile, there will be a corresponding number of individuals nc;q;t. In year t then
the global income distribution will contain Q quantiles for each country c; each with a number
of individuals nc;q;t who are assumed to have an income of ycq;t. Of course it is quite possible
that at time t more than one country-quantile will have the same average per capita income,
i.e. that ycq;t = y
bcbq;t for some c;bc 2 f1; : : : ; Cg and q; bq 2 f1; : : : ; Qg such that either c 6= bc or
q 6= bq: In that case, the total number of quantiles in the global income distribution in year t
would be less than the sum of all country-quantiles, QC. For the purposes of this subsection,
when we refer to a country contributing a quantileto the global income distribution in year
t, we use the term loosely, recognising that the e¤ect of including the countrys quantile data
might actually be to enlarge the size of an existing quantile in the global income distribution
we are constructing, rather than creating a new one.
5.3.1 Counterfactual analyses
Without loss of generality, it will be helpful in what follows to refer to China as country 1 and
India as country 2 and, since we are working in each country with nine deciles and two vingtiles,
Q = 11. Since we focus on analysing four particular years, we also have that T = 4; t1 = 1975;
t2 = 1985; t3 = 1995 and t4 = 2005.
In order to elucidate our counterfactual analyses, it is helpful to begin by considering China
and Indias contributions towards (our construction of) the actual global income distribution in
2005. Chinas contribution is the inclusion of 11 quantilesof data, such that for each quantile
q 2 f1; : : : ; 11g, n1;q;2005 individuals, each with an income of y1q;2005 take their place in the
17There are some notable exceptions. Bhalla (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2006) have constructed smooth within-
country distributions and based their global inequality gures on these estimates. Davies et al. (2008) also
constructed smooth within-country distributions, in the slightly di¤erent context of estimating the global distri-
bution of household wealth.
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global income distribution. Similarly, Indias contribution is the inclusion of 11 quantilesof
data, such that for each quantile q 2 f1; : : : ; 11g, n2;q;2005 individuals, each with an income of
y2q;2005 are included in the global income distribution. The remainder of the actual global income
distribution in 2005 is constructed similarly; for every c 2 f3; : : : ; Cg, there is a contribution
of 11 quantilesof data, such that for each quantile q 2 f1; : : : ; 11g, nc;q;2005 individuals, each
with an income of ycq;2005 are included in the global income distribution.
In the rst counterfactual analysis, we consider what inequality levels would have arisen in
the following circumstances. Suppose that Indias and Chinas incomes per capita and distrib-
ution of incomes (i.e. domestic quantile shares) had remained unchanged from 1975 to 2005, at
1975 levels. The populations in these countries are assumed, however, to have grown as they
actually did. This amounts to the following. In constructing the counterfactual global income
distribution in 2005, Chinas contribution is the inclusion of 11 quantilesof data, such that
for each quantile q 2 f1; : : : ; 11g, n1;q;2005 individuals, each with an income of y1q;1975 take their
place in the global income distribution. Similarly, Indias contribution to the counterfactual
distribution is the inclusion of 11 quantilesof data, such that for each quantile q 2 f1; : : : ; 11g,
n2;q;2005 individuals, each with an income of y2q;1975 are included in the global income distribu-
tion. All other countries contribute to the counterfactual distribution in 2005 exactly the same
as they contribute to the actual income distribution in that year; for every c 2 f3; : : : ; Cg, there
is a contribution of 11 quantilesof data, such that for each quantile q 2 f1; : : : ; 11g, nc;q;2005
individuals, each with an income of ycq;2005 are included.
In our second counterfactual analysis, we investigate what global inequality levels would
have resulted in the following situation. Suppose that China and India had been able to grow
their incomes per capita at the same rate as they actually did over 1975-2005, yet while also
maintaining the same quantile shares as in 1975. Again, the populations are assumed to have
grown as they actually did. In constructing this counterfactual global income distribution for
2005, Chinas contribution is the inclusion of 11 quantilesof data, such that for each quantile
q 2 f1; : : : ; 11g, n1;q;2005 individuals are included in the global income distribution, each with
an income given by:
(n1;q;1975)(y1q;1975)
n1;q;2005
11P
q=1
(n1;q;1975)(y1q;1975)

11P
q=1
(n1;q;2005)
 
y1q;2005

:
Similarly, Indias contribution is the inclusion of 11 quantilesof data, such that for each
quantile q 2 f1; : : : ; 11g, n2;q;2005 individuals are included in the global income distribution,
each with an income given by:
(n2;q;1975)(y2q;1975)
n2;q;2005
11P
q=1
(n2;q;1975)(y2q;1975)

11P
q=1
(n2;q;2005)
 
y2q;2005

:
As in the previous counterfactual scenario, all other countries contribute to this counterfac-
tual distribution in 2005 exactly the same as they contribute to the actual income distribution
in 2005.
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6 Results
The analysis described in the previous section provides some interesting results. The overall
ndings are summarized in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Global Interpersonal Inequality Estimates
Inequality Measure 1975 1985 1995 2005
Gini 0.727 0.702 0.704 0.681
MLD 1.314 1.136 1.074 0.981
MLD within-country component 0.254 0.232 0.335 0.381
MLD between-country component 1.060 0.905 0.740 0.600
Source: authorsestimates
The overall headline is that global interpersonal inequality has fallen during 1975 to 2005,
from 0.727 to 0.681 according to the Gini coe¢ cient, and from 1.314 to 0.981 according to the
MLD index. This decline has, for the most part, occurred fairly steadily over this time period.
With just one exception, both inequality measures register a decline in global interpersonal
inequality from each decade to the next. The one exception is that, according to the Gini
coe¢ cient, global interpersonal inequality remained almost unchanged between 1985-95.
A clue to what has driven the changes in inequality is apparent from an examination of the
within-country and between-country components of the MLD index. Apart from a slight de-
crease over 1975-85, within-country inequality has increased steadily over the period of analysis,
from 0.254 to 0.381. Ceteris paribus, this would, naturally, be expected to lead to an increase
in overall global interpersonal inequality over time. However, this dynamic has been more than
o¤set by a dramatic reduction in between-country inequality over the same period; this has
fallen from 1.060 to 0.600.
The changes that have occurred in within-country and between-country inequality are sub-
stantial and, since they have occurred in opposite directions, have led to a considerable change
in the composition of global interpersonal inequality. It can be inferred from the results in Table
2 that in 1975, the within-country component of global interpersonal inequality was just 19.3
per cent. By 2005, this had more than doubled to 38.8 per cent.
We now turn to our results for the counterfactual scenario in which we assumed that Indias
and Chinas populations grew as they actually did, but their incomes per capita and distribution
of incomes remained at 1975 levels. These results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Counterfactual scenario where Indias and Chinas populations grew as they actually
did during 1975-2005 but with no change in incomes per capita or distribution
Inequality Measure 1975 2005
Gini 0.727 0.764
MLD 1.314 1.449
MLD within-country component 0.254 0.272
MLD between-country component 1.060 1.177
Source: authorsestimates
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It is clear from Table 3, that in this counterfactual scenario, global interpersonal inequality
would have instead increased during 1975-2005 from 0.727 to 0.764, using the Gini coe¢ cient,
and from 1.314 to 1.449 using the MLD index. An examination of the decomposition of the MLD
index reveals that the increase that would have occurred in this counterfactual scenario, would
have been driven by increases in both between-country and within-country inequality, with the
betweencomponent playing a slightly bigger role. China and India were low-income countries
in 1975. If their incomes per capita had remained unchanged during the subsequent 30 years, a
period in which mean world incomes soared, an increase in between-country inequality would,
in light of their large populations, have been very much expected. The fact that the within-
country component of inequality would have increased even had Indias and Chinas income
distributions remained unchanged highlights the fact that increases in domestic inequality over
the period of analysis have certainly not been conned to these countries. However, the lions
share of the overall observed net increase in within-country inequality is indeed due to them.
Combining the results from Table 2 and Table 3, it is clear that the changes that took place
between 1975 and 2005 in Indias and Chinas income distributions have had a very pronounced
dampening e¤ect on global interpersonal inequality. What is interesting, is that this is despite
the fact that there were dramatic increases in both Indias and Chinas domestic inequality over
this same period. Chinas inequality increased from 0.279 in 1975 to 0.485 in 2005, according to
the Gini coe¢ cient, and from 0.130 to 0.429 according to the MLD index. Indias Gini coe¢ cient
increased from 0.402 in 1975 to 0.509 in 2005 and its MLD index increased from 0.269 to 0.474.
The explanation for this dichotomy lies, of course, in the dramatic growth which occurred in
both countries over this timeframe, taking them from poor countries to middle-income countries.
The picture overall then is largely that the very changes to Chinas and Indias domestic
income distributions which have caused both huge growth, but also spiralling domestic inequal-
ity, have in fact caused global interpersonal inequality to fall, when it would otherwise have
risen. So the changes that have occurred in these two countries have been simultaneously good
for inequalityand bad for inequality,depending on which income distribution one feels is the
more relevant one.
As indicated in the previous section, we performed one further counterfactualscenario. We
considered what would have happened, with respect to global interpersonal inequality, if India
and China had been able to grow their per capita incomes at the same rate as they actually
did over 1975-2005, while maintaining the same quantile shares as in 1975. The results of this
analysis are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Counterfactual scenario where India and China grew as they actually did during
1975-2005 but with no change in domestic inequality
Inequality Measure 1975 2005
Gini 0.727 0.662
MLD 1.314 0.872
MLD within-country component 0.254 0.272
MLD between-country component 1.060 0.600
Source: authorsestimates
Our results suggest that in this scenario, global interpersonal inequality would have fallen
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even further by 2005; to 0.662 according to the Gini coe¢ cient, and to 0.872 according to the
MLD index. Needless to say, this further fall in inequality, relative to what actually happened,
would have been driven exclusively by there being a much smaller level of within-country in-
equality than that which actually emerged, and this is conrmed by the decomposition of the
MLD index in Table 8. This serves to emphasize the point that the increases in domestic in-
equality in India and China have certainly not been goodfor global interpersonal inequality
per se. They have only been goodto any extent that they have been an unavoidable side e¤ect
of high economic growth that has led to a marked reduction in between-country inequality. It
would certainly have been better still for global interpersonal inequality if the same growth
could have been achieved in these countries without associated increases in domestic inequality.
We have seen that when the changes that occurred in China and India during 1975 to 2005 are
controlled for, the remaining net increase in the within-country component of global inequality
is much more modest. However, within individual countries, there have been both signicant
increases and signicant decreases in domestic inequality during the period of analysis. Our
attention now turns to some of these countries. In particular, it is of interest to see whether
any obvious trends emerge, either with respect to geographic region or with respect to mean
incomes or growth in mean incomes.18 Tables 5 through to 8 display the Gini coe¢ cients,
GDP per capita and growth in GDP per capita (over the full period) for those countries for
which we have data in both 1975 and 2005. The four tables are divided into four very loosely
dened geographicregions: Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East,
Asia, Europe and North America.19
Table 5: Ginis and GDP per capita in Latin American and Caribbean countries in 1975 and
2005
Gini % Increase in Gini GDP per capita % Growth in GDP per capita
Country 1975 2005 1975 2005
Argentina 0.361 0.477 32 9462 10833 14
Brazil 0.578 0.532 -8 6161 8509 38
Colombia 0.513 0.551 7 4574 7305 60
Costa Rica 0.453 0.460 2 5650 9042 60
El Salvador 0.445 0.483 9 4817 5702 18
Guatemala 0.439 0.524 19 3313 4062 23
Jamaica 0.516 0.543 5 6565 7083 8
Mexico 0.557 0.493 -11 8295 12191 47
Panama 0.447 0.524 17 6223 9167 47
Peru 0.571 0.502 -12 6203 6387 3
Uruguay 0.446 0.472 6 6440 9683 50
Venezuela 0.402 0.463 15 12183 9924 -19
Average 0.477 0.502 5 6657 8324 25
Source: authorsestimates
18To be clear, by obvioustrends we mean just that. An in depth study of the complex interactions between
inequality, geography, mean incomes and growth is well beyond the scope of the present study.
19The Average rows at the bottom of Tables 9-12 require careful interpretation. Simple averages of the
domestic Ginis and the average domestic GDP per capita are reported, as are the percentage increases in these
averages over the period. Ginis and GDP per capita for the region as a whole and their percentage increases are
not reported.
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Table 6: Ginis and GDP per capita in African and Middle Eastern countries in 1975 and 2005
Gini % Increase in Gini GDP per capita % Growth in GDP per capita
Country 1975 2005 1975 2005
Cote dIvoire 0.529 0.500 -5 2686 1666 -38
Egypt 0.435 0.378 -13 1687 4491 166
Malawi 0.519 0.444 -14 639 645 1
Nigeria 0.498 0.489 -2 1574 1750 11
Tunisia 0.496 0.462 -7 3387 7182 112
Zambia 0.519 0.557 7 1773 1158 -35
Iran 0.560 0.439 -22 9759 9228 -5
Israel 0.360 0.408 13 13984 23340 67
Jordan 0.406 0.444 9 2277 4334 90
Turkey 0.470 0.455 -3 5907 11465 94
Average 0.479 0.458 -5 4367 6526 49
Source: authorsestimates
Table 7: Ginis and GDP per capita in Asian countries in 1975 and 2005
Gini % Increase in Gini GDP per capita % Growth in GDP per capita
Country 1975 2005 1975 2005
Australia 0.317 0.275 -13 18183 32523 79
China 0.279 0.485 74 409 4115 906
Indonesia 0.427 0.448 5 1016 3102 205
Republic of Korea 0.390 0.319 -18 4284 22783 432
Philippines 0.452 0.467 3 2424 3051 26
Thailand 0.417 0.444 6 1694 6675 294
India 0.402 0.509 27 849 2209 160
Nepal 0.510 0.521 2 570 954 67
Pakistan 0.350 0.369 5 1065 2145 101
Sri Lanka 0.389 0.456 17 1313 3550 170
Average 0.393 0.429 9 3181 8111 155
Source: authorsestimates
Some obvious trends do emerge from Tables 9 to 12. As expected, domestic inequality has
been generally rising between 1975 and 2005. Africa and the Middle East is the only one of
our loosely dened regions in which the average country from our sample has seen a decline
in inequality. Within each region, there is considerable variation with respect to levels of, and
changes in, inequality. For example, in Europe, Bulgarias Gini has increased by 87 per cent,
while Greeces has fallen by 18 per cent; in Latin America, Argentinas Gini has increased by 32
per cent, while Brazils has fallen by 8 per cent; in the Middle East, Israels Gini has increased
by 13 per cent, while Irans has decreased by 22 per cent and in Asia, Chinas Gini has increased
by 74 per cent, while Koreas has decreased 18 per cent. The latter comparison is an interesting
one. China and Korea have both been extraordinarily successful with respect to growth in
mean incomes over the period studied, yet have had very di¤erent experiences with respect to
changes in domestic inequality. An in-depth study of the relationships between mean incomes
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Table 8: Ginis and GDP per capita in European and North American countries in 1975 and
2005
Gini % Increase in Gini GDP per capita % Growth in GDP per capita
Country 1975 2005 1975 2005
Austria 0.292 0.293 0 17555 33626 92
Belgium 0.265 0.286 8 17898 32189 80
Bulgaria 0.169 0.316 87 5921 9809 66
Canada 0.325 0.330 2 20374 35033 72
Denmark 0.272 0.237 -13 18390 33193 80
Finland 0.222 0.275 24 15501 30708 98
France 0.345 0.310 -10 17550 29453 68
Germany 0.319 0.306 -4 17592 31115 77
Greece 0.398 0.326 -18 14809 24348 64
Hungary 0.224 0.302 35 9628 16975 76
Ireland 0.299 0.326 9 11339 38896 243
Italy 0.383 0.361 -6 15406 28280 84
Netherlands 0.276 0.295 7 20030 35104 75
Norway 0.313 0.290 -7 21411 47626 122
Portugal 0.372 0.363 -2 10057 21369 112
Spain 0.324 0.372 15 14693 27392 86
Sweden 0.235 0.254 8 19329 32703 69
Switzerland 0.336 0.309 -8 29274 36964 26
UK 0.233 0.361 55 16625 32958 98
USA 0.357 0.411 15 22396 42516 90
Average 0.298 0.316 6 16789 31013 85
Source: authorsestimates
and inequality and growth in mean incomes and changes in inequality are not our intention.
Nevertheless, some interesting correlations do emerge from the data in Tables 9 to 12. These
are displayed in Table 9.
Table 9: Correlations between inequality, GDP per capita and growth
Correlations
1975 Gini & 2005 Gini & % Inc in Gini &
GDP per cap GDP per cap Growth in GDP per cap
Latin America & Caribbean -0.306 -0.435 -0.215
Africa & Middle East -0.357 -0.487 0.028
Asia -0.376 -0.867 0.705
Europe & North America 0.316 -0.036 0.018
Total Sample -0.564 -0.801 0.356
Source: authorsestimates
Overall, higher Gini coe¢ cients appear quite strongly negatively correlated with levels of
GDP per capita, and the strength of the correlation is higher in 2005 than it was in 1975.
This pattern holds in each of our individual regions, apart from Europe and North America.
Overall, and somewhat in contrast, there is a modest positive correlation between the increase
in Gini coe¢ cients and growth in GDP per capita. However, this pattern is not consistent across
regions and is mainly driven by Asia, in which there is a strong positive correlation. In fact,
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this correlation disappears completely when China is omitted.20 Omitting China has relatively
little impact, however, on the correlations between Gini and GDP per capita levels; without
China the overall correlations for 1975 and for 2005 become -0.607 and -0.798 respectively.
7 Sensitivity analysis
We are aware of some of the potential sources of error in our estimates of global inequality,
including sampling error, measurement error and, as discussed by Anand and Segal (2008),
assuming a single PPP price level for each country. There is also the issue of the extent to
which assuming equal incomes within country-quantiles is likely to bias the inequality measures
downwards.
Anand and Segal (2008:90) have argued that Sensitivity analysis should be undertaken to
assess the possible impact of these errors and assumptions, even if there is insu¢ cient informa-
tion to estimate statistical condence intervals...They also illustrate in some detail why The
standard errors estimated in the literature do not address these concerns.We broadly agree
with Anand and Segal (2008). With respect to the di¢ culties involved in estimating statistical
condence intervals, we would perhaps even go as far as to argue that such a task is impossible.
There is simply too much uncertainty regarding the sizes and directions of some of the biases.
We will discuss some of the issues in turn and then consider their possible net impact.
7.1 Sampling error and bias
There are well-established techniques for estimating the standard errors arising from a sample
not being representative of the population under study. The di¢ culty in the present context, as
pointed out by Anand and Segal (2008), is that we are not dealing with a random sample of the
global population. Rather we are dealing with a constructed sample, based on many di¤erent
national surveys, each with their own sampling variance. Estimating the sampling variance of
the resulting distribution is a di¢ cult problem and a solution is not easily apparent.
A related issue is the extent to which our results are likely to su¤er from sample selection
bias. Given the nature of household surveys, one might expect this to impart a downward
bias on our estimates, since it is rare for very high earners to be surveyed. However, we make
this conjecture somewhat tentatively and without a method for estimating the extent of this
potential bias. Moreover, any such bias needs to be considered in tandem with possible biases
arising from measurement error, as discussed next.
7.2 Measurement error
Measurement error is likely to arise from a number of sources, notably the quantile share data
from the various surveys and the GDP data measured in US$ PPP. Indeed measurement error
in the latter might itself arise from either the raw GDP calculations or the estimation of the
PPP conversion rates. Measurement error in the population data is a further possibility.
Anand and Segal (2008) argue that since the responses from those who are surveyed are
likely to be noisy, this would bias the variance of the responses upwards which might cause
20 Indeed it becomes slightly negative, falling to -0.031 overall and to -0.280 in Asia.
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measured inequality to be overstated. This is a reasonable argument. However, as Anand and
Segal (2008) also point out, surveys are also likely to su¤er from underreporting of the incomes
of the rich and from undersampling of both the richest and the poorest. These dynamics would
be expected to bias inequality in the opposite direction.
Now, if the GDP data are biased upwards (respectively, downwards) for low-income coun-
tries, or downwards (respectively, upwards) for high-income countries, measured global inequal-
ity will be biased downwards (respectively, upwards), due to the resulting impact on the between-
country component of inequality.
If population sizes are biased upwards (respectively, downwards) in lower-income countries,
or downwards (respectively, upwards) in higher-income countries, this will tend to bias measured
global inequality upwards (respectively, downwards), due to the resulting impact on both the
between-country and within-country components of inequality. Unfortunately, however, the
direction and size of biases resulting from measurement error in the GDP data and of country
population sizes are very di¢ cult to predict. Overall, given the multitude of surveys and the
various uncertainties involved, it is unfortunately not at all clear what even the direction of the
net bias due to measurement error should be expected to be, let alone its size. This is certainly
an area for future research enquiry.
7.3 Assuming a single PPP price level for each country
Further biases are likely due to the necessary evil of assuming a single PPP price level for each
country-year. This issue has been discussed by Aten and Heston (2010) and Anand and Segal
(2008). In short, if prices faced by individuals are positively correlated with incomes, as is
often the case, the assumption of a single PPP price level will tend to bias measured inequality
upwards.21 On the other hand, economies of scale tend to favour the better o¤, who are more
likely to be able to buy in bulk. This may result in a negative correlation between prices and
incomes and a downward bias on measured inequality. The overall direction of the net bias
even at a given country-level is di¢ cult to predict; estimating the overall e¤ect of such biases
globally appears an almost insurmountable task.
7.4 Assuming equal incomes within quantiles
As we have discussed, in this source of error at least, there is no doubt about the direction
of the bias. Assuming equal incomes within country-quantiles certainly biases our inequality
measures downwards and indeed, ignoring the various other sources of bias discussed above, we
might consider our various inequality estimates to be lower bounds.
Anand and Segal (2008:88) have suggested that studies which take our approach should
construct an upper bound for within-country inequality, by considering how high inequality
would be if the distribution within income intervals were assumed to be maximally unequal.
We agree that this is a nice idea. However, it is a more challenging problem that it might, at
rst sight, appear. The main di¢ culty stems from the fact that we do not, in general, know
the upper- and lower-income bounds within each quantile. So, for example, inequality would
increase if the income of the poorest individual in the second quantile decreases as far as is
21 It is well known that incomes are often higher in expensive regions.
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possible, whilst remaining in the second quantile. Inequality will also increase if the income of
the richest person in the poorest quantile increases as far as is possible, while remaining in the
rst quantile. Unfortunately, however, we do not know where the cut-o¤ point between the two
quantiles is.
If there were just two quantiles, it might be relatively straightforward to evaluate the optimal
(counterintuitively, with respect to maximizing inequality) cut-o¤ point between the quantiles
but the complexity of the problem increases as the number of quantiles increases. Consider
the following. As the upper bound to the rst quantile decreases, this tends to decrease the
amount of inequality that can arise within the rst quantile and increase the inequality that
can arise within the second quantile. However, with more than two quantiles, we also need to
choose a cut-o¤ point that bounds the top of the second quantile from the bottom of the third
quantile. The truly optimal bound for the top of the rst quantile (with respect to maximizing
inequality) can then be expected to depend on where the optimal upper bound to the second
quantile lies - and so on. A solution to this problem is not readily apparent to us and it perhaps
represents an interesting topic for future research.
8 Discussion
Our overall estimates of global inequality levels lie broadly in the same ball park as those of
previous studies. For example, Dowrick and Akmal (2005) reported Ginis of 0.698 in 1980 and
0.711 in 1993, Sala-i-Martin (2006) found Ginis of 0.660 in 1980 and 0.637 in 2000, Bhalla (2002)
reported Ginis of 0.686 in 1980 and 0.651 in 2000, Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) found a
Gini of 0.657 in both 1980 and 1992 and Milanovic (2005) reported Ginis of 0.622 in 1988 and
0.641 in 1998.
Our estimates lie towards the upper end of the existing literature, closest to Dowrick and
Akmal (2005). This is likely to be partially related to the manner in which we have adjusted
for data which are reported as consumption quantiles rather than income quantiles. As we have
discussed, this imparts an (intentional) upward impact on our global inequality measurements.
Our analysis of the impact of China on global interpersonal inequality is consistent with
that of Sala-i-Martin (2006), who found that without China, global inequality would have risen
from 0.620 to 0.648 from 1970 to 2000, whereas in fact it actually decreased.
Our analysis of trends in within-country and between-country inequality and of the impact
of India and China seem at least partially consistent with that of Bourguignon and Morrisson
(2002). They found that between 1970-92, global income inequality, as measured by the MLD
index, increased slightly from 0.823 to 0.827. Whilst we found that global income inequality
decreased between 1975 and 1995, our within-country and between-country components moved
in the same directions as theirs. (Their within-country component increased from 0.304 to
0.332, while their between-country component decreased from 0.518 to 0.495).
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002:738) also found that ...the relatively poor growth per-
formances of China and India until late in the 20th centurywas one of the main disequalizing
forceswhile Chinas outstanding growth performance in the last decade or two of the period
was one of the main equalizing forces.Whilst we consider a much shorter period of analysis
(which starts much later but also nishes later), our results as to the impact of China and India
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are consistent with theirs.
There are also some notable points of divergence in our results. For example, Milanovic
(2002) found that inequality, as measured by the Gini index, increased from 0.63 in 1988 to
0.66 in 1993. Moreover, this increase was driven more by di¤erences in mean incomes between
countries than by inequalities within countries. Although we do not consider these exact years,
these results do seem somewhat at odds with our ndings for 1985-95, especially with respect to
the trends in within-country and between-country inequality; as discussed at length in Section
3, we nd that within-country inequality increased considerably over this period, while between-
country inequality decreased substantially.
9 Conclusions
Using the most up-to-date and complete database of worldwide distributional data presently
available, we have estimated global interpersonal inequality levels and their trends during the
period from 1975 to 2005. This is the rst study to provide a comprehensive picture of global
inequality levels prior to the nancial crisis of 2007-08.
As in previous studies, the global inequality gures estimated in this paper represent very
high levels indeed. This is especially so in light of the fact that our gures might be considered,
as we have discussed, to be lower bounds of the true values. Generally speaking, we live today in
a very unequal world. Global inequality gures are much higher than domestic levels in even the
most unequal countries of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. The dynamic which causes
this is clear from our decomposition of global inequality into within-country and between-
country components. The latter component is still the dominant factor in global inequality.
This is due to the dramatic growth in China and India that accompanied dramatic increases in
inequality in those countries, and which in turn resulted in a net decrease in global inequality.
Strong but above all, more inclusivegrowth in developing countries, especially populous ones,
remains a potent tool for reducing global interpersonal inequality.
However, the general trend towards increasing domestic inequality should be a matter for
concern, not just for nation states, but also for those concerned with global equity and stability.
If current upward patterns of inequality continue in large emerging markets such as China
and India, with dramatic growth but also large increases in domestic inequality, in not too
many years time this will lead to increases in both the within-country and between-country
components of global inequality.
A major challenge for both future research and for policy makers in the years ahead will
be to nd ways of achieving strong growth without allowing inequality to spiral to dangerous
levels. It may be instructive to learn from the experiences of countries such as the Republic of
Korea which have somehow managed to achieve this.
Finally, it is worth reecting on the fact that there are other dimensions to inequality
than the income-based focus in this study and others we have referred to. Some are likely to
be strongly correlated with income but others perhaps less so. Bourguignon and Morrisson
(2002:728), for example, have found that health disparities are probably not much larger today
than they were in the early 19th century..., despite dramatic increases in income inequality. This
may or may not be the case across other important dimensions of wellbeing such as education,
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easy access to clean water and so on. Greater knowledge in these domains would clearly be of
signicant value.
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10 Appendix
Table 10: Countries covered in 1975
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guatemala,
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, USA,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia
Table 11: Countries covered in 1985
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lesotho,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Uganda, Ukraine, UK, USA, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela
27
Table 12: Countries covered in 1995
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cote dIvoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic,
Lao, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Uganda, Ukraine, UK, USA, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen,
Zambia
Table 13: Countries covered in 2005
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic,
Lao, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, UK, USA, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia
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